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FEDERAL TAX LIEN PRIORITY: AN INJUSTICE
TO CREDITORS
By THOMAS C. MCNALLY III*
FEDERAL tax lien priority is a prominent issue among legal scholars
as well as practicing attorneys. Much has been written on the subject
to date,' and more will be written concerning it in the near future.
The reason for this is the large number of adverse decisions which favor
the government lien over that of the individual creditor although the
creditor's lien be considered valid and enforceable under state law. A
remedy for this injustice to the individual lienholder has not, as yet,
been granted either by judicial decisions or Congress. Until such
remedial action is taken the issue will be kept in the foreground.
Article I, section 8 of the Federal Constitution allows the establish-
ment of a tax lien by Congress as an exercise of its constitutional power
"to lay and collect taxes."2 This tax lien is established by federal law
under sections 6321 and 6322 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The controversy does not exist because of this tax lien, but because of
the priority given it by Revised Statutes section 3466, of 1875, 3
stating that debts due to the United States shall first be satisfied in the
case of a debtor's insolvency.
The rationale for this priority is said to be founded upon motives
of a public policy to secure adequate revenue to sustain public burdens
and discharge public debts.4 The actual advantage the government
secures from its liens and priorities is the collection of claims and
obligations from those who did not incur them. The government tends
to "rob Peter to pay Paul's taxes."' This advantage serves as an injus-
tice to all creditors, both secured and unsecured.
* Member, second year class.
' Comprehensive studies of Federal priority include: Kennedy, The Relative Priority of
the Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905
(1954) ; Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAx L. REv. 247, 459 (1958)
(other studies enumerated therein n. 1).
' United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
3 31 U.S.C. § 191. The application of this section to tax claims was set down in Price v.
United States 269 U.S. 492 (1926). The obligation to pay any penalty imposed by the United
States constitutes a debt due the United States within the meaning of this section. (Set out
in 41 U.S.C. § 108(d) ). Bankruptcy proceedings are not included under this section. Priorities
in Bankruptcy are contained in 11 U.S.C. § 104.
' United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 (1941).
See Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAX L. REV. 247, 459 (1958).
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Development of the Federal Priority
In one of the earlier cases decided under Revised Statutes section
3466, Thelusson. v. Smith,6 it was determined that a general judgment
lien upon the lands of an insolvent debtor does not take precedence over
claims of the United States unless execution of the judgment has pro-
ceeded far enough to take the land out of the possession of the debtor.
In effect, there must be "a change of title or possession." 7 This test was
clarified in Conrad v. Atlantic Insurance Co.' where it was stated that
"the judgment creditor in the Thelusson case received no title to the
proceeds of the land because he had not 'perfected his title by an execu-
tion and levy.' "' From these two early cases, it can be established that
unless a judgment creditor had his debtor's property in his hands at
the time the federal lien arose he had no chance of obtaining it in the
future. This gross injustice was recognized by the federal government
and partially alleviated by the enactment of section 632 3(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code. The present situation can be summarized as
follows:"°
A federal tax lien asserted against a taxpayer's property under sec-
tions 6321-6322 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 prevails over all
other claims against such property -except (1) those specifically pro-
tected by section 6323 (a) ; (2) those which attach and become "choate"
before the federal lien attaches.
Application of Section 6323(a)
Until 1913 no third parties were protected from Revised Statutes
section 3466; but in 1913, as a result of United States v. Snyder,1
three classes-purchasers, mortgagees and judgment creditors-were
held exempt until notice of the federal lien had been filed. 2 In 1939
pledgees became the fourth class of exempt creditors under this section. 3
Whether a person comes under one of these protected classes, enu-
015 U.S. (2 Wheat) 396 (1817).
7 Id. at 426.
8 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828).
1d. at 442.
"0 Acquilino v. United States 363 U.S. 509, 516 (1959) (dissent).
22 149 U.S. 210 (1893). In this case it was decided that the United States is not subject
to the recording laws of a state. Although Louisiana had such a law the assessment was
never filed. A corporation purchased the property for full value, in good faith and in ignor-
ance of the alleged assessment. (It took the Congress many years, however, before positive
action was taken.)
'"Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016 (now INT. Rav. CODE of 1954 § 6323 (a) ).
The filing requirement is contained in INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 6323 (a) 1&2.
"' Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 401, 53 Stat. 882.
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merated in section 6323(a) of the code, depends on the facts in a given
case rather than the technical definition of the class.'"
In the leading case of United States v. Gilbert 5 it was said that
the term "judgment creditor" should have the same application in all
states, and that in section 6323(a) the words "judgment creditor" are
used in the usual conventional sense of a judgment of a court of record,
since all states have such courts. 6
To come within the class of purchasers set out in section 6323(a)
the lienholder must be one who acquired title for a valuable considera-
tion in manner of vendor and vendee. 1
In United States v. Ball Construction Co.'" it was held that assign-
ment made by a subcontractor to his performance bond surety of all
sums to become due for performance of the subcontract, as security for
any indebtedness or liability thereafter incurred by the sub-contractor
to surety, did not constitute the surety a mortgagee of those sums within
meaning of section 6323(a).
From these cases and others concerned with pledgees, 9 it can be
noted that the classes in this section are restricted. "[E]mphasis is
placed upon the narrow letter rather than the spirit and purpose of the
excepting clause."2
Another exception which came about as a result of United States v.
Rosenfield2' was in the cases of "securities." 22 This exception is strictly
limited to items enumerated in section 6323(c) 2 and therefore does
" REV. RUL. 56-592, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 945.
15 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
"6 Id. at 364. New Hampshire assessment was in the nature of a judgment, enforced by
warrant instead of execution; see United States v. Record Pub. Co., 60 F. Supp. 194, (N.D.C.
1945). Creditor not entitled to prior lien as judgment creditor by merely giving notice "to
withhold" recovering judgment before government filed notice. See also United States v.
Waddill, Holland and Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
' United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1954) ; United States v. Chapman, 281 F.2d
862 (10 Cir. 1960) (Assignment of contracts as security for loans does not render assignee
a purchaser under see. 6323(2) of INT. REV. CODE of 1954) ; United States v. Kings County
Iron Works Inc., 224 F.2d 232 (2 Cir. 1955).
18 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
" E.g., United States v. Toys of the World Club, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
(An artisan's lien cannot be denominated a "pledge" within context of section 6323(a)).
20 MacLachlan, Current Developments Relating to Federal Liens and Priorities, 66 Com.
L.J. 265 (1961).
2126 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 1938). A tax lien duly filed before the sale of securities
survives the sale; a bona fide purchaser for value without actual notice of the lien took title
subject to the lien.
-22Rev. Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 247(b), 53 Stat. 882 (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 6323 (c)).
" Securities are defined under the code as "any bond, debenture, note, or certificate or
other evidence of indebtedness, issued by any corporation with interest coupons or in regis-
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not refer to intangibles generally, such as accounts receivable and life
insurance policies, nor does it extend to tangible personal property.2"
Application of the Concept of Choateness
Holders of liens other than those exempted by section 6323 (a) are
wholly unprotected, but may secure priority over federal liens on the
theory that their lien was specific and perfected before the federal lien
attached. The genesis of the doctrine of the inchoate and general lien
is attributed to Spokane County v. United States, 5 a proceeding wherein
the federal tax claims of the United States were given priority over
county tax claims because there was no distraint nor any other proce-
dure taken by the county to render its claims a specific lien.
The doctrine of the inchoate lien was not actually applied by the
Supreme Court until twenty-one years later in United States v. Security
Trust and Savings Bank of San Diego.2" This case involved the relative
priorities of a tax lien of the United States and an attachment lien filed
in California, where the tax lien was recorded subsequent to the date
of the attachment but prior to the date the attaching creditor received
judgment. The court relied on the "inchoate nature" of California's
attachment lien. It was defined as "merely lis pendens notice that a
right to perfect the lien exists."2 A lien of a garnishee was subject to
the same fate in United States v. Liverpool and London and Globe
Insurance Company Ltd.2"
Since Spokane County, the requirement that the lien be specific and
perfected has been extended to cases where this has contradicted the
applicable state lien law. Although a state court's classification of a
lien as "specific and perfected" is entitled to weight, it is subject to
re-examination in the United States Supreme Court, specificity and
perfection being federal questions. 9
tered form, share of stock, voting trust certificate, or any certificate of interest or participation
in, certificate for deposit or receipt for, temporary or interim certificates for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to, or purchase any of the foregoing; negotiable instrument or money."
2' Grand Prairie State Bank v. United States, 206 F.2d 217 (5 Cir. 1953) (ring) ; United
States v. Royce Shoe Co., 137 F. Supp. 786 (D.H.N. 1956) (life insurance) ; Plumb, supra
note 5, at 466.
25 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
-8340 U.S. 47 (1950). See also McKenzie v. United States, 109 F.2d 540 (9 Cir. 1940).
- United States v. Security Trust and Say. Bank of San Diego, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950);
see also United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955) (Ohio attachment lien).
-8348 U.S. 215 (1955).
28 United States v. Acri, 348 U. S. 211 (1955) ; see United States v. Ball Construction Co.,
355 U.S. 587 (1958) (contractual lien) ; United States v. White Bear, 350 U. S. 1010 (1956)
(mechanic's lien) ; United States v. Waddill, Holland, and Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945)
(landlord's lien).
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A lien, in order that it be deemed "choate," must pass the three-fold
test set down by the Supreme Court in People of State of Illinois ex rel
Gordon v. Campbell:3" (1) identity of the lienor, (2) amount of the
lien, and (3) the property to which it attaches. It was held that when
these three elements were established the lien would be considered
"choate" in the federal sense. This test, however, is subject to such
strict interpretation that few creditors' liens have passed it." In United
States v. Gilbert,32 a case in which these requirements were fulfilled,
the court said that there was an additional requirement of transfer of
title or possession and it therefore held the lien to be a general, unper-
fected lien.
In United States v. City of New Britain,33 involving liens for mu-
nicipal real property taxes and water rents, it was stated that the con-
trolling principle is "the first in time is the first in right. '3 4 Priority
is determined by the time at which competing liens "attached to the
property and became choate."35 This was the first case to find a lien,
which had not been enforced by taking possession or title, to be choate
in the federal sense. The New Britain case aroused anticipation of a
more liberal interpretation in favor of individual liens, but its value is
doubtful because of later decisions. 36
In one of these later decisions, United States v. White Bear, Justice
Douglas, in his dissent, stated :
7
The court apparently holds that under 26 U.S.C. section 3670 [now
26 U.S.C. section 6321], a lien that is specific and choate under state
law, no matter how diligently enforced, can never prevail against a
subsequent tax lien, short of reducing the lien to final judgment. That
is a new doctrine, not warranted by our decisions and supportable only
if the New Britain case was overruled.
The New Britain case, however, has not to date been overruled. The
deciding principle of "first in time is first in right" has been applied
in most later cases concerned with federal priority. The principle has
not been a determining factor for many judgments, the courts still being
30 329 U.S. 362 (1946). The lien in this case did not pass the test; for "all personal
property used in the business" was said to be too vague. However, miscalculation as to the
amount of the lien was not sufficient, in itself, to make the lien inchoate.
" United States v. Waddill, Holland, and Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945) (might assert
setoff) ; United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941) (possibility of dispute over amount).
82 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
33 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
31 Id. at 85.
:1 Id. at 86.
"' United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957) ; United States v. White Bear Brewing
Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) ; United States v. Coletta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955).
8" 350 U.S. 1010 at 1011 (dissent).
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nebulously tied up with "choateness." The lien must first be deemed
choate in the federal sense before this principle will be applied.3"
Determination of the Status of the Property
State law determines the nature of the legal interest which a tax-
payer possesses in the property sought to be reached by the federal
government in asserting its tax lien. Section 6321 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954 creates no property rights but merely attaches conse-
quences, federally defined, to rights created under state law. 9
Recent Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Durham40 and
Acquilino v. United States,4 recognized the so-called "no property"
rule. In each of these cases, under their respective state laws (North
Carolina and New York), a federal tax lien against a contractor was
said to attach only to the residue or net amount of the unpaid balance
to which the contractor was entitled after settlement with his subcon-
tractors. The subcontractors have the right of direct payment and were
not defeated by the federal liens. Government tax liens cannot prevail
if, at the time of the assessment, the property against which the lien is
asserted does not belong to the taxpayer.
Conclusion
In a recent Circuit Court decision,"2 the court mentions the "choate
lien test" as requiring that the state-created liens be specific to the point
that nothing further need be done to make the lien enforceable. This
is a 1960 case, but how does it differ from a case decided thirty-one
year prior-Spokane County v. United States.43 There is actually no
difference in their holdings of "choateness."
In the last thirty-two years nothing has been done to improve the
position of the individual lienholder. The principle set out in the New
Britain case was really nothing more than a reiteration of Rankin v.
Scott." In that case the court stated:"'
The principle is believed universal, that a prior lien gives a prior claim,
which is entitled to prior satisfaction, out of the subject it binds, unless
the lien be intrinsically defective, or be displaced by some act of the
.. United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957) ; United States v. White Bear Brewing
Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956); United States v. Coletta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955).
:D United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958).
0 363 U.S. 522 (1960).
41363 U.S. 509 (1960).
"United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1960).
"279 U.S. 80 (1929).
"25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 177 (1827).
45 Id. at 179.
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party holding it, which shall postpone him in a court of law or equity
to a subsequent claimant.
Although judicial decisions have not proved adequate in protecting
the individual creditor, they are capable of doing so by liberal interpre-
tation of the classes protected under Section 6323(a), and by estab-
lishing a reasonable test whereby a lien will, upon inspection, promptly
qualify as being either choate or inchoate.
We should also turn to Congress for the enactment of a statute,
similar to section 6323(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, exempting
other classes of lienholders.
Another solution would be to enact a bill amending those sections
of the Internal Revenue Code which deal with the priority of federal
tax liens. The American Bar Association has sponsored such a bill,
presently pending in Congress.46 It is designated "Federal Liens Priori-
ties and Procedures Act of 1961." This act, inter alia, would amend
section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code by striking out "validity
against mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers and judgment creditors" and
inserting, in lieu thereof, "validity against security interests, liens and
transfers." This bill also would amend 31 U.S.C. section 191 which
provides exceptions to the federal priority. These exceptions include:
(1) administrative expenses, (2) funeral expenses, (3) wage claims,
(4) state and local taxes and (5) claims for rent. This bill, which is
a thorough analysis of the entire field of federal priorities, was pre-
sented for the purpose of protecting persons entering into business
transactions against federal lien claims of which they have no knowledge
and, in many instances, no means of discovering. This bill is the proper
remedial action, and its enactment may serve as a major step in repair-
ing the wrong which has been done to the individual lienholder.
" S. 1193, H.R. 4319, H.R. 4320, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
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